The registry writes the stored gem name straight into its line-based
compact index, both the shared `/versions` listing (one `GEMNAME
versions md5` line per gem) and the per-package `info/{name}` file. The
parser only rejected an empty name or one containing a slash, so a
`.gem` whose gemspec `name` carries a newline was accepted and persisted
as the package name, letting an authenticated uploader forge extra lines
in the shared index and so spoof additional gem names, versions and
checksums to clients. The name is now checked against the upstream
RubyGems name pattern in the parser, which is the layer that already
validates the version.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
**Packages-index stanza injection via Debian control file**
A `.deb` whose `control` file appends extra paragraphs after a blank
line was still accepted, and `ParseControlFile` stored the whole
multi-stanza blob in `p.Control`. That blob is re-emitted verbatim into
the generated `Packages` index, so the embedded blank line splits it
into separate stanzas and an uploader can smuggle a package entry with
an attacker-chosen `Filename` into the shared index. A binary control
file only holds one stanza, so parsing now stops at the blank line that
terminates it; well-formed packages are unaffected and the new subtest
covers the trailing-stanza case.
---------
Signed-off-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
